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Abstract  
This thesis discusses the use of prediction markets in event studies, more specifically what type of 
information can be extrapolated from prediction market prices and how can this information be 
used in order to forecast election results. The topic has been recently in the forefront of academic 
research of event studies as it has empirically been noted that prediction markets offer high 
predictive power and offer large sources of data in fields where data has been hard to come by.  
The intention of this thesis is to outline previous research on the topic and study the question with 
the help of current market theory. The theoretical basis that is used in this analysis draws from 
Eugene Fama’s efficient market hypothesis and Milgrom and Stokey’s information and trade under 
common knowledge to name a few.   
This thesis intends to critically examine whether or not there is any theoretical justification for 
using prediction markets as a support-tool for decision-making and what advantages and 
limitations there may be in deriving information from prediction market prices and in using it to 
forecast election results.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
Introduction  
  
The study of prediction markets has grown in recent years as prediction markets have found to be 
a rich source of empirical data with both theoretical and real-world value. Prediction markets are 
defined to be a marketplace where a trade contracts payoff is tied to a future event (Wolfres & 
Zietzewitz, 2006a). Prediction markets can be used to project corporate sales, predict economic 
indicators and forecast election results, the latter being the key focus of this paper.    
Prediction markets have been a topical issue, as prices gathered from the market correspond with 
the probabilistic distribution of market expectations for a certain event of occurring (Wolfres and 
Zietzwitz). This aggregated market expectation has been found in certain cases to be more 
accurate than other forms of forecasting, which means that prediction markets have several 
applications. It can act as a support-tool for real-world decision-makers and for academic 
researchers who to study market behavior and expectations.   
In the context of predicting election results, aggregated prediction market prices have historically 
been a better predictor for election results than opinion polls. The most famous prediction market 
for elections is the Iowa Electronics Market, which is a non-profit future market run for academic 
purposes and offers e.g. contracts on who will win an election and by what vote share (Wolfres 
and Zietzewitz, 2006a).   
Prediction markets have grown significantly in volume in recent years. An internet betting 
exchange Betfair reported that in 2012 50 million USD was bet on the winner of the American 
presidential elections while in 2016 the corresponding figure was 130 million USD (Reuters, 2016). 
Betfair also reported that an aggregate of wagers worth 159 million USD had been put on the 
Brexit referendum, meaning that betting on political results is a worldwide phenomenon. It should 
further be noted that betting on political results is actually illegal in the United States, unless it is 
for academic purposes like in the case of the Iowa Electronics Market.  
It is important to note that prediction markets are not the only relevant market for forecasting 
political elections. For instance, the value of the pound/dollar exchange rate fell months before 
the Brexit referendum as markets had ingrained some of the risk of an exit from the European 
Union into market prices. Furthermore, stock exchanges movement generally coincides with the 
direction of expected policy changes.   
 Therefore defining what a prediction market consists of can be conceptually difficult, if there are 
alternative and more profitable ways for rational agents to profit from political results than the 
prediction market. This means that studying those market places can also give a good indication of 
expectations.   
However, the strength in studying the prediction market is that it gives us a very good estimate for 
market-aggregated probabilities as prediction market contracts are well defined and thus, 
manages to isolate the exact phenomenon of interest which in this case is predicting election 
results. Prediction markets are also sizable enough to offer statistically relevant data.   
Prediction markets are also relatively free of noise that will channel into other markets such as 
stock markets. Changes in economic outlook will effect both the stock market and the prospects 
of candidates getting elected, meaning that forecasting election results through stock market 
movements would be performed with the help of a statistically limited model.   
In most cases, the odds of elections are calculated with pari-mutuel betting or “winner-takes-all” 
betting systems. In pari-mutuel betting, bets are pooled together and odds are calculated by 
comparing the amount of winning bets to the entire betting pool. Pari-mutuel betting is used in 
rank-order tournaments. Rank-order tournaments are situations where participants finish in a 
rank and candidates can be sorted from best to worst in a uniform way (Thaler & Ziemba 1988). 
However, other betting systems can also be employed and prediction markets often offer a 
myriad of contracts, not just on rank-order results. The advantage of pari-mutuel betting systems 
for researchers is simply that it quantifies probabilities of winning an election as odds.   
  
Efficient Market Hypothesis and betting markets  
  
According to Eugene Fama’s (1970) seminal paper on efficient market prices, prices should “fully 
reflect” the available information. He further categorized markets into both weak and strong form 
efficiency: weak form market prices account all historical publically available information while 
strong form prices reflect all the information including private information. Wolfres and Zitzewitz 
(2006a) concluded that prediction markets seem to adhere to weak-form efficiency.  
Efficient prices follow a random walk according to Fama, which in this case means that betting 
only on public knowledge should not yield profit opportunities as it is already reflected in the 
prices although as discussed further, there are still profit opportunities if information diffuses with 
a lag or if the market consistently over-reacts to information.   
Fama does not explicitly define what the necessary parameters for efficient market places are 
though he lays some sufficient conditions. For instance, having a frictionless market without 
transaction costs and, where investors agree on the implications of new information would be 
sufficient conditions according to Fama, but they are not requirements for efficient markets.  
Markets could still be efficient with high transaction costs if traders take into account all of the 
available information, however efficiency would be broken if transaction costs inhibit traders and 
arbitrageurs to enter the market place and correct the misdirection of prices. Correspondingly, 
traders can have heterogeneous beliefs and differences of opinion. According to Fama prices will 
still be efficient as long as there are no traders that can consistently make better evaluations on 
public information that reflects into market prices.   
Since prediction markets employ a zero-sum game, efficiency implies that the expected rate of 
return to bettors has an upper bound of zero. In reality, prediction markets yield on average 
negative returns for bettors as both the bookmakers and bettors cannot make a profit 
simultaneously. Even in a marketplace that does not have bookmakers or transaction costs, 
information acquisition is a cost that needs to be considered.   
  
If prediction markets do indeed, yield on average expected negative returns then why would there 
be participators in the market? This question is not the focus of this paper, but will be briefly 
discussed. One proposed argument is that people and especially many bettors do not behave 
rationally. In the field of psychology and behavioral economics, irrational behavioral patterns are a 
hot topic. Several studies have been done to try to describe how bettors have ingrained biased 
heuristics that effect their decision making e.g. gamblers fallacy, gamblers ruin etc. (Croson & 
Sundali, 2005)  
Even consistent losses may not deter agents away from the market because for most people who 
gamble for pleasure, the utility is gained from other sources than expected financial returns. This 
is in stark contrast to, for instance capital markets where capital firms have set expectations for 
the return on capital and the owners of such companies would punish consistent losses by 
investing elsewhere. Hence, companies behaving irrationally and making a consistent loss would 
eventually drop from the market place.    
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) criticized the prominent expected utility theory, which states that 
under uncertainty individuals will choose the outcome that offers the highest expected return. 
Kahneman and Tversky point out that rather than choosing simply the highest expected return, 
humans frame their projected gains and losses asymmetrically to a certain reference point, 
meaning that bettors asses their gains and losses in proportion to their current wealth.  
  
According to Kahneman and Tversky in situations where both heavy losses and heavy gains are 
possible, experiments have shown that individuals behave in a more risk-seeking fashion:  
individuals choose the option that offers higher gains to compensate for the losses even if this 
would not offer the highest expected utility. Studying whether prediction market agents behave in 
a risk-loving fashion (as most gamblers do) or if they are risk averse (as most investors are), would 
be an interesting topic for further behavioral economic research.    
However, whether or not all agents are informed and rational is not a requirement for market 
prices to be efficient. Efficient market prices can be reached by a small subset of informed agents 
whom may drive prediction market prices to their true value while a large number of agents 
remain uninformed and irrational  (Hurley & McDonough, 1996). Irrationality in this context 
means that some agents base their predictions on irrelevant data. A finding of efficiency does not 
imply the absence of irrational behavior.   
  
Market construction with rational agents  
  1. Common prior concordant beliefs  
  
Milgrom and Stokey (1980) provided a model in which agents have access to public knowledge, all 
agents are rational and all agents are concordant e.g. everyone shares a common opinion of how 
certain information and its effects should be interpreted. Milgrom and Stokey focused their 
analysis on what happens to prices if new information, either private or public would be 
discovered. Private information refers to information accessed by only a small subgroup of the 
total population.   
  
It is apt to assume that truly democratic elections’ results are predicted generally with the help of 
publicly available information. Econometric predictive models are built using publically available 
figures such as economic growth, unemployment rates, tentative poll and estimations on voter 
turnout. Though there may be sources of private information that may influence elections, due to 
its’ very nature private information is difficult to observe and the impact of private information is 
difficult to measure in truly democratic elections.   
  
One could for instance hypothesize that the inner workings of party politics influences what type 
of visibility certain candidates receive. Hence, if one would possess intimate insider knowledge 
concerning the power relations within political parties this might give an unfair advantage to 
certain agents regarding the prediction markets. However in a concordant world with ex ante 
Pareto-optimal allocations, trade should still not occur according to Milgrom and Stokey.  
  
The simple logic behind this theorem is that if the motive of an agent is to find an advantageous 
bet then for a trade to occur when all beliefs are concordant, a trade is acknowledgment of the 
fact that one party is submitting to a disadvantageous bet. The only way for a bet to occur is if one 
side has access to more information and even then, rational agents would not accept the bet as ex 
ante public knowledge has channeled into prices and any willingness to accept a different price 
would be a sign of private knowledge or irrationality. According to Milgrom and Stokey it is in fact 
a pre-existing condition that prediction markets require uninformed and irrational participants in 
order for the marketplace to exist.  
  
If we expand private information to not only include literal private information as analyzed by 
Milgrom and Stokey, but to include knowledge and skills which are costly to acquire, such as an 
indepth understanding of statistical sciences or privately collected statistical information relevant 
to election results, the analysis becomes more complex.   
  
However, according to Feldman (1987), rational, concordant agents would converge into a rational 
belief equilibrium either through market learning or by agents who consistently make a loss 
dropping from the market place. Therefore, the concluding result would be a market place where 
beliefs would become homogenous though this is likely not to be found in real-world prediction 
markets and current academic research allows for heterogeneous beliefs.  
  
2. Heterogenous Beliefs  
In the context of predicting election results, there are many underlying reasons why trades could 
still occur within the prediction market. As discussed prior, not all agents behave rationally. 
Secondly, assuming that all beliefs are concordant is a strict assumption and very likely does not 
reflect the real world. There may very easily be differences in opinion regarding what type of 
information is relevant to the overall result of truly democratic elections.  
  
Morris (1994) argued that individuals might not hold a common prior understanding, as events 
have not occurred frequently enough to draw a universal conclusion. This could certainly apply to 
predicting elections, as elections occur infrequently and the theoretical framework of predicting 
elections is inconclusive.  
  
Hong and Stein (1999) propose that information diffuses gradually within the market. This could 
likely be because information acquisition comes at a cost or because some data may not be 
available to everyone. Hence, market prices do not immediately reflect the “true” value and this 
leaves room for trading opportunities.  
  
According to Banerjee, Kaniel and Kremer (2009), traders do not recognize what other traders 
know, as they can only observe some type of aggregate opinions through prices. Agents 
understand that other traders’ opinions will influence prices but they disagree on the extent that 
new information will affect the behavior of other traders, hence this leaves the opportunity for 
new information to generate a drift in prices.   
  
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) argued that market prices could not truly be informative in 
conditions where information acquisition is costly. “If price systems were truly informative then 
there would be no differences in beliefs, if there were no differences in beliefs; there would be no 
trade; but then it appears that it is prices in markets where there is no trade which leads to 
uniformity of beliefs”. Grossman and Stiglitz argued that costless information is a necessary 
condition for efficient market theory to hold and that it is not a realistic assumption in real world 
prediction markets.  
  
However, Grossman and Stiglitz’s analysis does not take into account that both price formation 
and information diffusion, as Hong and Stein noted, occurs relative to time. Therefore, if the 
acquisition of new information does not immediately reflect into the prices there are still 
possibilities for rational traders to profit from their information acquisition. This is especially true 
regarding information, which is accessed at first by only a few market participants.   
  
They key question is then what exactly is meant by prices being efficient. As prediction market 
prices have been found to be weak form efficient, efficiency in this case implies that market prices 
reflect all publically available information immediately, the expected returns correspond with the 
level of riskiness the contract and no investment strategy based on historical technical data can 
outperform the market in the long run. Efficient market prices do not require all beliefs to be 
concordant, but it requires that in the long-run investors cannot consistently profit from 
information that does not reflect into prices.   
  
The famous favorite-longshot bias directly contradicts market efficiency, as it has been found on 
multiple occasions in betting markets that above expected returns have historically been gained 
by backing favorites to win while longshots i.e. those with smaller probabilities of winning, have 
statistically speaking overvalued odds (see Hurley and McDonough, 1996). The favorite-longshot 
anomaly occurs near the extreme ends of the probability spectrum.   
  
One proposed explanation for the commonly found anomaly is that humans are poor at assessing 
the probabilities of very unlikely events (long shots) and poor at providing accurate estimates on 
probabilities with small incremental changes (favorites) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As discussed 
previously, betting simply on technical price data should not yield above average returns and 
another offered explanation for this anomaly is proposed by Kahneman and Tversky who state 
that one-time larger gains may compensate for consistent smaller losses and provide additional 
utility through e.g. bragging rights.  
  
Average Market Price  
  
Because of the differences in beliefs and interpretations, the market would act as an aggregator of 
these varied beliefs. This line of thinking dates back to Friedrich A. Hayek (1945) whom argued 
that the main function of the price mechanism was to synchronize local knowledge and 
communicate it to others. The average price would in this line of thinking be a representation of 
the average belief of who bettors think would win.  
  
However, Charles Manski (2004) showed quite controversially that in cases of binary options the 
aggregate price does not need to represent average belief, albeit it provides some useful 
information on the distribution of beliefs. Manski’s model can also be expanded to pari-mutuel 
betting, which as previously described, is commonly used to determine the pay-off structure for 
election odds.   
  
Manski’s analysis, though controversial, holds if all agents are risk-neutral e.g. would be willing to 
wager their entire budget for an “underpriced” odd and if the budget and beliefs of agents are 
uncorrelated. While Manski’s results should not be understood as an absolute truth as both 
assumptions are very extreme and can easily be challenged, they still show how easy it is to 
construct a scenario where the aggregate market price does not reflect the mean belief.  
  
Wolfres and Zietzewitz conversely concluded that market prices are a highly informative 
description of mean belief, and any divergence from the mean is only a small absolute error. 
Wolfres and Zieztwiz commented Manski’s findings by stating that extreme assumptions yield 
extreme implications, referring to Manski’s assumption of risk-neutrality. Wolfres and Zietzewitz’s 
models does not require risk neutrality but rather assumes the logarithmic utility function. The 
logarithmic utility function is consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, in that the 
marginal utility of gains decreases when referenced to a starting budget.  
  
It has now been postulated that bettors in the prediction market do not behave fully rationally 
and that market prices do not convey all the relevant information nor do they necessarily have to 
even convey the aggregate average beliefs of bettors. The question that then remains to be 
answered is: what information can be garnered from prediction market prices and how can this 
information be used to determine election results?  
i Theoretical justification of Charles Manskis model  
  
Information Transmitted Through Prediction Market Prices  
  
Betting market prices give insight on the probabilities which bettors give candidates to win 
elections. The prices reflect the direct opinions of the bettors of who they think will win. Even if 
the beliefs of bettors are biased, the general assumption is that the market prices are not biased 
as they are aggregated from a large pool of information sources and account for all available 
public information thus providing an accurate estimate for the true probabilities.   
Kou and Sobel (2004) argued that whether or not prices are efficient in themselves, does not 
necessarily reflect whether prices offer a good power of predictability. Efficient market prices are 
an indication that the market is fair with limited opportunities of arbitrage and speculation, but it 
is entirely possible that market prices are well risk-adjusted. This could still mean that there is 
considerable risk i.e. that the confidence intervals of probabilities relative to their outcomes is 
notable, diminishing the predictive power of market prices. It would simply mean that the 
riskiness of the product would be accounted for in the prices, not that the risk itself wouldn’t 
exist.  
Why should the prediction market provide improved analysis on the understanding of the current 
political climate? Gruca and Berg (2007) stated that there is a substantial, directional bias in the 
information that is publicly available i.e. the public overreacts to news that has very little influence 
on voter behavior and irrelevant news may influence market prices as a form of noise. Since there 
are monetary rewards for traders who are able to detect the informational bias relative to market 
prices, it is in the traders’ best interest to correct these biases by buying or selling, thus moving 
prices in the direction that reflects the “true” probabilities.  
Traders in prediction markets also use a myriad of tools to analyze probabilities. As there are 
financial incentives to map out the probabilities correctly, it could be assumed that rational 
traders would be incentivized to conduct thorough analysis with the help of econometric and 
statistical modelling rather than use only their subjective understanding to predict election 
outcomes, even if this would mean incurring some costs. These incentives could mean that 
prediction markets could yield more accurate results than other alternative methods.   
In theory, rational investors in election markets should be capable of ignoring short-term shifts in 
public opinions, such as spikes in popularity that occur after party conventions (Erikson & Wlezien,  
2008), but which eventually disappear come Election Day. Election traders have limited 
opportunity to profitably speculate off short term noise: if any noise would be transmitted into 
prices it would be at the expense of those misinterpreting the signals.   
  
Because prediction market contracts have a set expiration date (i.e. Election Date), attempts to 
artificially inflate market prices or try and engage in other forms of price speculation should not 
succeed. At least they should not succeed without having to take considerable risk by purchasing a 
significant amount of contracts above their true market value. (see Erikson and Wlezien)  
  
Tetlock (2004) estimated that there might exist a small degree of negative serial correlation 
between returns, meaning that there are bettors who consistently misevaluate the probabilities of 
a candidate’s victory. This could be because of non-monetary motivation such as partisanship and 
political stance. It could also be a finding of irrationality where participants base their wagers on 
irrelevant data. Those bettors would exert pressure on prices to deviate from their true values; 
however, informed traders would still cause the prices to converge to their true values.   
An instructive example of how naively interpreting prediction market prices as objective truths is 
flawed was shown by Wolfres and Zietzewitz while studying the 2004 US Presidential elections. 
Wolfres and Zietzewitz studied contracts that paid one penny for each percentage point of the 
two-party vote share won by the Democrats, conditional on the trader also correctly picking the 
winner of the Democratic nomination race.  
  
Wolfres and Zietzewitz reported based on these contracts that the favorite to win the Democratic 
candidacy: John Kerry was estimated to have a probability of 50% for winning the General Election 
against the republican nominee while John Edwards who trailed John Kerry by 15% was given a 
probability of 55%.  (2006b)  
Hence naively assuming that Democrats should maximize their respective candidates presidency 
by electing John Edwards is flawed since bettors had taken into account, that in order to secure 
the democratic nomination Senator Edwards would require the popular votes of the Democrats to 
shift in his favor by a successful marketing campaign, which would resonate with the voters. Such 
a dramatic shift in public sympathies would result in his improved chances of winning the general 
elections thus justifying the higher probability.   
Such scenarios give birth the opportunity of arbitrage if one were to find a contract where:   
P (A)*(B)> P (B|A) P (A),   
For instance in the previous example:  
 P(Edwards wins dem. nomination)*P(Edwards wins the general election)>P(Edwards wins the 
general election on the condition that he is nominated)  
Thaler and Ziemba (1988) studied horse tracks, found that in general, betting markets were 
efficient, and provided very few arbitrage opportunities but there were a few anomalies (i.e. 
Favorite Long shot bias). There are financial gains for markets to correct such anomalies, meaning 
that they usually exist only for a brief window in time. Tetlock (2004), who studied prediction 
markets and sports betting markets, has also replicated these findings.   
Researchers have tried to isolate prediction market expectations and establish a causal 
relationship between other commodities. For instance, Roberts (1990) studied movements in 
prediction market prices during Ronald Reagan’s re-election and movements in stocks of defense 
firms implying that re-electing Ronald Reagan would increase defense spending. He found that 
defense stocks responded to the shifts in the perceived probability of Ronald Reagan’s re-election 
during the election cycle.   
Tetlock criticized current theoretical frameworks on prediction markets because they try to 
explain market-pricing behavior through financial theory even though the financial markets and 
betting markets are not analogous: inefficiencies in betting market do not translate to 
inefficiencies in financial markets and vice versa.   
  
The markets are different in both their market construction and participants’ behavior. Betting 
markets consists of some risk-loving participants, whom may use non-monetary reasons for trade 
while risk-averse traders in financial market generally base their investment decisions on rational 
models. Second, the markets themselves differ in that prediction markets have lower volumes and 
higher transaction costs implying that there may exist impediments to markets correcting their 
prices through arbitrage.    
  
Therefore, Tetlock recommends heeding with caution before drawing conclusions between 
financial markets and betting markets. Understanding which type of market inefficiencies 
influence the prediction markets and understanding the nature of the market participants has 
room for further empirical study.  
  
Comparing Polls with Market Prices  
  
Polls that measure simply whom a particular voter intends to vote provides only a small snapshot 
of time. Opinion polls provide the average response from statistically significant sample groups 
but polls provide a narrow scope as they measure only the intention of a voter. However, they are 
often corrected with more complex models such as the trial-heat model, which takes into account 
e.g. the state of the economy (Campbell, 1996). Aggregated averages of polls are these days more 
preferable in order to improve their reliability.  
This intention is subject to change and the act of polling is subject to several biases. Inherently, 
opinion polls have flaws that skew their accuracy and restrict the unbiased, scientific knowledge 
that could be derived from their results in order to forecast the election results. Polls also have a 
tendency to overreact to short term stimuli which evaporates by Election Day, thus hindering their 
forecasting value.  
First, in order to have a credible result, poll-makers should be able to randomly select the people 
who submit a reply to the poll. This is clearly not the case as online surveys, phone surveys, 
written questioners etc. are well documented of having issues with randomizing their respective 
repliers possibly skewing the results and miring the validity of the results. The same could be said 
for prediction markets as participation in these markets is distorted and prices have some 
component of higher order expectations ingrained in them meaning that they reflect whom the 
voters think other voters think will win rather than who they themselves think actually will win.  
(Rothschild, 2008)  
Second of all the answers gained from polling are inconclusive as they measure intent to vote, not 
actions. Polls are highly susceptible to time. Whether or not a voter will turn up on Election Day 
and vote or whether he will change his opinion during the election-cycle, will affect the quality of 
results gained from polling. Using a large sample size in polling does not reduce this inherent 
uncertainty present at predicting election results through poll responses.   
The aforementioned issue is one major reason why it is seen preferable to use prediction market 
prices to predict election results as opposed to the use of scientific opinion polls. As Wolfres and 
Zietzewitz have put it “Markets aggregate opinions and, by requiring a trader to put your money 
where your mouth is” e.g. the key advantage of prediction markets over alternative approaches is 
that it provides the truthful revelation of probabilities that agents give for election results (2006a).   
Using the idea of truthful revelation of beliefs, Wolfres et al. find that opinion polls that measure 
who a voter expects to win rather than who he himself will vote for, give a more accurate forecast 
than polls that measure voter intent. This could be attributed to the fact that voters would draw 
from a larger pool of information through their respective social networks and their 
understanding of public information thus conveying more information to the pollster in a similar 
fashion of how a marketplace would operate. (Rothschild & Wolfres, 2011)   
Furthermore another issue with opinion polling is that the polls are conducted, aggregated and 
published through a slight lag and due to the expenses incurred by collecting the opinions of 
thousands, polling is conducted infrequently by individual polling stations. This means that 
individual polls do not necessary portray an up-to-date snapshot of current voter intention, rather 
public sympathies may fluctuate in any given direction. However the impact of this error can be 
diminished by aggregating different polling stations, thereby offering snapshots through different 
time-periods and accessing a larger pool of voters, diminishing the effects that one skewed poll 
may have on the results.    
The sensitivity of polls relative to time is not an earth-shattering revelation and so it begs the 
question should polls be used as such to forecast elections that happen long in the future or is the 
practical value of polls in understanding what the current preferences of voters are on a set date, 
which polls are a good indicator of. Shouldn’t the inherent practical and theoretical use of polls 
therefore include but not be limited to furthering the understanding of how political changes 
influence voter behavior?    
Both polling and prediction markets are susceptible to the fact that by simply gathering 
information on the different probabilities of winning and by distributing this information to the 
public, the results of the elections may change. This new information can change the general 
perception of the public and in extreme cases influence voter turnout during the Election Day.  
The extreme opposites of public perception influencing voter behavior are known as the 
bandwagon effect and underdog effect. The bandwagon effect means that voters will vote for the 
candidate who is perceived to be on top. This is proposed to be the result conformity or “herd 
behavior” and another alternative explanation for the phenomenon is that humans prefer to back 
winners and want to be associated with success (Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1994).   
The bandwagon effect may also manifest itself as a strategic consideration when a voter perceives 
that his or her preferred candidate has “no chance” of winning the election based on current polls 
or prediction market information. Therefore the voter will change his or her respective vote in 
favor of his second most preferred candidate to try and ensure that his least preferred candidate 
does not get elected. (Sher, 2011)  
The opposite effect is known as the underdog effect, where the public decides to vote for the 
candidate perceived to be trailing.  There are also some descriptive psychological explanations for 
the underdog effect mainly attributing it to the human ability to sympathize with the underdogs 
and thereby influencing voter behavior. How the underdog effect manifested itself in elections is 
when the supporters of the candidate who is favorite to win fail to show up during Election Day as 
they perceive their candidate’s victory to be a certainty because of e.g. recent poll results (Sher, 
2011). The committed supporters of the underdog experience thus a relatively higher voter 
turnout and this causes a deviation in the actual elections results and polled results and in 
extreme cases, reverses the fortunes of the two candidates.   
A unique detriment to prediction markets is that wagering money on election results gives an 
incentive for market participants to try to manipulate the outcome of the election itself. While this 
is likely not such a big issue in largescale elections such as the American presidential election, 
where voter turnout is in the millions, it is still and issue that needs to be considered and has 
historically been a cause for concern (Rhode & Strumpf, 2004) It is also the main reason why 
betting on political events is illegal in the United States.    
Forsythe et al. (1992) concluded that market prices do not follow poll results rather market price 
fluctuations predate changes in polls and may predict changes in poll results. The key question 
that Forsythe asked is what new information do polls provide? Is the information of a small, 
biased sample group relevant at predicting election results? If market prices are on average both 
in the short and long run better at estimating election results then should not an informed bettor 
use market prices rather than polls to correct his or her beliefs. However, these results have been 
challenged by other researches (see Kou and Sobel, 2004).   
It should be underlined that prediction markets do not dispense the need for opinion polling. 
Scientific polling can be used as a tool in tandem with prediction markets. One assumption is that 
the results from scientific polls can also influence the prices of prediction markets as the new 
information gained from such extensive polls provides some relative insight of the probabilistic 
boundaries of voter behavior. It could be assumed that bettors would use trial-heat polls as a tool 
for their decision-making.  
It should also be noted that other more sophisticated models of forecasting have emerged in 
recent years generated by political scientists and contemporary literature acknowledges the 
shortcomings of opinion polls.  These advanced models likewise offer better predictive power 
than opinion polls, but have their accuracy has yet to be tested in regard to market prices 
according to my understanding.   
However, intuitively if these models would provide a better understanding of the phenomenon, 
then rational traders would update their beliefs and start incorporating these models so that 
market prices would begin to mimic their results. This would lead to a convergence in prediction 
market prices and in the results that such models would yield.   
  
Market Accuracy in Respect of Time  
  
While several studies have been conducted, proving the short-term accuracy of prediction 
markets (see Rothscild et al.) the long-term accuracy of prediction market contracts is not as clear-
cut though most recent empirical studies agree that prediction markets are still better than 
alternative possible methods at predicting election results long-term.   
Asch, Malkiel and Quandt (1982), while talking about pari-mutuel betting in general suggest that 
informed bettors should wait for the last possible moment before making a bet. This is mainly 
because of two reasons. Firstly, early in the betting cycle as transaction volumes are smaller, even a 
modest wager can influx the odds.  Furthermore as election-cycles progress more information is 
revealed about the probabilities of the candidates. While this information could potentially help all 
bettors, it lowers the variance of expected returns for rational, informed agents.   
 Thirdly Asch, Malkiel and Quandt point out: those agents with some private knowledge should 
wait for the last possible moment to reveal their information in order to avoid the bandwagon 
effect which in this case would mean that other bettors adjust their beliefs through the true 
market prices. Once private knowledge would be revealed through market prices it would 
gradually become public knowledge thus limiting the ability of one holding such information to 
profit. In fact by waiting for the last possible moment rational bettors can gain from the 
knowledge that has already been revealed in prices by others.  
Page and Clement (2013) also studied the influence that the time-dimension has on prediction 
market prices and noted that traders with time discounting preferences receive no interest for the 
funds committed to their prediction market contracts. Therefore, the incentive to trade grows the 
closer one is to the contract expiration date e.g. Election Day. This is especially true for those 
bettors, whose beliefs are very close to the true market prices and therefore, would stand to 
make only a small profit in the first place.   
Logically this preference to wait for the end of the betting period before submitting a bet can be 
observed through market volumes. As market volumes are smaller, the prices are less likely to 
contain all the possible, relevant information. It is only natural to assume that the prices would 
converge to their true values once all of the market participants submit their information. Hence, 
long-term contracts are unsurprisingly less informative than their short-term market prices (Berg 
et al, 2001).  
For instance Erikson and Wlezien (2008) noted that using prediction market prices to predict the  
US election in 2008 6 months prior to the election would have resulted in an average error of 5%. 
Similar results were gained by Berg et al. (2001), who concluded that the average standard error 
of prediction markets 84 days prior to the Election Day for U.S presidential elections from 
19882000 was about 2,5%.   
  
  
Conclusions  
  
Prediction markets offer a novel way of forecasting elections and offer a rich source of data that 
can be used to understand changes in voter expectations in response to political changes. 
Prediction markets have grown in their market size in recent years which theoretically would 
improve their predicting power. Furthermore prediction markets isolate the exact phenomenon of 
interest and offer a novel way of accessing information thus justifying its appeal for researchers 
and decisionmakers alike.  
In general betting market prices have been found to be efficient with a few exceptions, however 
understanding that efficiency does not describe the quality of information which markets base 
their decisions on nor does it guarantee the accuracy of the forecasts derived from prediction 
market prices is paramount to interpreting the results. Efficiency is an indication of fair markets 
and prediction markets have been found to be weak-from efficient.  
Furthermore as pointed out by Tetlock, a shortcoming of the current theoretical framework is that it 
attempts to explain prediction markets by using modern financial theory even though the markets 
are not identical in their construction or in their agents’ behavior. Whether participants are 
riskaverse as capital market agents are, risk-loving similar to gamblers or risk-neutral has implications 
on what information prediction market prices convey. Manski and Wolfres & Zietzewitz provided 
conflicting models on whether market prices provided an aggregated belief or not and their models 
depend on the participants attitude towards risk.  
Prediction markets offer financial incentives for participants to correct the over-reaction and outside 
noise. Therefore prediction markets theoretically encourage for a truthful revelation of beliefs thus 
being in many ways superior to other forms as forecast such as opinion polls. All public information 
should in theory channel into prediction market prices however one should heed with caution when 
drawing conclusions from the market prices as was demonstrated by Wolfres and Zietzewitz. Finally, 
the accuracy of prediction markets improves over time and this was in part due to the discounting 
preferences and low volumes of traders at the start of the election cycle.   
It can be stated that further research is necessary in understanding the behavior of prediction 
market participants and understanding the construction of the market. This is vital, should one 
wish to understand how intelligent are the markets at gathering all of the relevant data and what 
type of information can be derived from prediction market prices. Though prediction markets offer 
a lot of promise in the field of event studies, naively believing in the superiority of markets over 
other sources of information is misguided as understanding the complexities of election recycles 
requires a comprehensive understanding of the field. Other tools such as opinion polling can and 
should be used in tandem with prediction markets.  
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